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CHAPTER 2 
 
THING AND SPACE IN HUSSERL 
 
Summary 
The phenomenological reason shows how the space and the thing conceived by 
the scientific and natural thinking are a construction upon the unitary and 
meaningful world of everyday experience; therefore the aim of this chapter is to 
analyze, from an Husserlian point of view, the most foundational layers of 
“space” and “thing” beginning from the most fundamental stratum, called by 
Husserl “phantom”, the mere res extensa, and arriving at kinaesthetic fields in 
which the apprehensional character of  the things  depends from the interplay of 
sequences of K’s (kinaesthetic circumstances) and i’s (correlative images) which 
blend into a unitary and meaningful system of experience. 
 
1. Introduction 
Thing and Space is the title of a course hold by Edmund Husserl in the Summer 
semester 1907 at the University of Goettingen; the German original was published 
posthumously in 1973 as volume XVI of Husserliana. The course began with five 
introductory lecture which were published in 1947, bearing the title The Idea of 
Phenomenology. 
The specific matters at issue in this course are “thing” and “space” which he 
analyzes under the general frame of a “critique of reason”. 
While for Kant the task of reason  amounts to constitute the scientific reality of 
thing, for Husserl instead, the thing at issue is the thing of everyday experience; 
what we need, Husserl declares, is: 
 
to clarify , from the side of experiential cognition, not only the lower levels of the experience 
which lies prior to all deduction and induction- in short, prior to all logically mediated cognition in 
the usual sense- but also, and a fortiori, we would need to clarify the higher levels.1  
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In short, theoretical reason aims at showing how the things conceived by the 
scientific and natural thinking result from a construction upon the unitary and 
meaningful things of everyday experience. 
The focus of the analyses concerning thing and space is then the constitution of 
the most foundational layer of the most foundational things. 
This lower foundational stratum, called by Husserl “phantom”, is the appearance 
of a mere res extensa, that is, an extended structure filled merely with sense 
qualities and not yet with substantial properties. 
To do this job, the investigations ought to solve the riddle of transcendence, 
making the phenomenological reduction effective in order to arrive at a sphere of 
“pure phenomena”.2 
Husserl prefaces the proper analysis of the “Thing-Lectures” with a brief 
introduction in which he affirms that the matter at issue is the analysis of natural, 
pre-scientific experience which has primarily a perceptual character; in and 
through this natural attitude, we experience a world that is familiar and always 
already there: 
 
In the natural attitude of spirit, an existing world stands before our eyes, a world that extends 
infinitely in space, that now is, previously was, and in the future will be. This world consists of an 
inexhaustible abundance of things, which  now endure and now change, combine with one another 
and then again separate, exercise effects on one another and then undergo them. We ourselves fit 
into this world; just as we find the world, so we find ourselves, and we encounter ourselves in the 
midst of this world. A pre-eminent position in this world, however, is proper to us: we find 
ourselves to be centers of reference for the rest of the world; it is our environment.3 
 
Since the end of the XIX century, Husserl aims at the clarification of the scientific 
concepts by returning to the intuitive ground from which they spring; for this 
reason  Husserl retains that the analysis of the geometric space ought to be 
anticipated by the investigation of the intuitive space which constitutes the genetic 
foundation of the former. 
In Raumbuch, Husserl declares that what distinguishes geometrical concepts from 
experiential concepts is the fact that the former are obtained through a process of 
idealization; in this sense, they cannot be considered as morphological concepts 
31 
Philosophical exercises. Inquiries into phenomenology and philosophy of language 
 
which are apprehended on the basis of sensible perception which is, per 
definitionem, inaccurate and vague. 
Geometrical concepts, instead can be viewed as passages to limits, ideas in a 
Kantian sense, insofar they are guided by essential processes which go beyond the 
experience. 
Notwithstanding this relevant difference between space of experience and space 
of geometry, it is undoubted, in Husserl’s view, that  geometry takes root in the 
intuition, since geometry has a content fundament. 
In a brief to Natorp, dated 15.3.1897, Husserl affirms that through mere formal 
determinations we cannot arrive at space, but only to an Euclidean variety.  
In §70 of Prolegomena to Pure Logic, Husserl points out: 
 
If we use the term ‘space’ of the familiar type of order of the world of phenomena talk of ‘spaces’ 
for which, e.g. the axiom of parallels does not hold, is naturally senseless. It is just as senseless to 
speak of differing geometries, when ‘geometry’ names the science of the space of the world of 
phenomena. But if we mean by ‘space’  the categorial form of world-space, and, correlatively, by  
geometry the categorial theoretic form of geometry in the ordinary sense, the space falls under a 
genus, which we can bound by laws, of pure, categorially determinate manifolds, in regard to 
which it is natural to speak of ‘space’ in a yet more extended sense.4  
 
In this point of view, Euclidean geometry corresponds to the most direct 
idealization of the phenomenal space: it is, as a matter of fact, as infinite, 
tridimensional, homogeneous, isotropic as the space of intuition. 
To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to underline that the processes of 
idealization, according to Husserl, don not occur “on” the ground of intuition, but 
are prepared “inside” of it  through passive synthesis by virtue of which the world 
is constituted for us: idealization does not mean construction or even abstraction. 
According to Husserl there is then a layer of experience which precedes language, 
historically determined cultures and science: 
 
Thus one can put forward by itself the problem of the manner of being of the life-world; one can 
place oneself completely  upon the ground of this straightforwardly intuited world, putting out of 
play all objective-scientific opinions and cognitions, in order  to consider generally what kind of 
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“scientific” tasks to be resolved with universal validity, arise in respect  to this world’s own 
manner of being5.  
The world of experience is not a chaotic and disorganized world, but it has an 
invariable style, a particular spatial-temporal form. 
To reach then the common layer of experience, we may begin with the leitmotiv 
represented by the constitution of the spatial thing. 
 
2.The thing in Ideas I 
In § 150 of Ideas I, Husserl considers how the region “physical thing” could serve 
as a clue for a phenomenological investigation. 
We can arrive, Husserl notes, to the region “physical thing” through the attitude of 
ideation, proceeding like the geometer in the “freedom and purity” of his 
geometrical intuition.  
He continues stating that the regional idea of the physical thing, that is, its 
identical X with its sense-contents “prescribes rules governing the multiplicities of 
appearances”.6 
In this sense, Ullrich Claesges notes, transcendence reveals itself as a noetic-
noematic structure, that is, as modus by virtue of which natural consciousness, 
through “Abschattungen”, posits the self manifesting object. 
The totality of the essence of the thing remains transcendent, falling out from the 
field of the transcendental subjectivity: 
 
Die Totalitaet des Wesens scheint in der transzendentalen Reflexion nicht einholbar. Das  Wesen 
wird zu einem X, das in unaufhebbarer Diskrepanz zu dem steht, was von ihm zur adaequaten 
Gegebenheit kommen kann.7 
 
Notwithstanding the inaccessibility of the totality of the essence “physical thing”, 
we can note, through eidetic variation, that each physical thing-appearance 
necessarily includes in itself a stratum called by Husserl “physical thing-schema”: 
 
…it is the spatial shape merely filled with “sensuous” qualities- without any determinateness of 
“substantiality” and “causality”…8 
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Adopting this way of investigating the problems concerning phenomenological 
constitution, Husserl concludes that all the troubles regarding the origin of the 
idea of space can be reduced  to the phenomenological analysis of the essence of 
all noematic and noetic phenomena in which space is intuitively presented and 
constituted as the unity of appearances; for this reason we comprehend the 
intimate link which ties thing and space in phenomenological investigations. 
Through originary experiencing consciousness we can arrive at determining the 
different levels and the strata of physical thing-constitution: 
 
Every level, and every stratum in the level, is characterized by the fact that it constitutes an own 
peculiar unity which, on its side, is a necessary middle member for the full constitution of the 
physical thing.9 
 
To begin with, we ought to consider that in pure phenomenological attitude there 
are groups of features which are not represented in the apprehension; the thing 
which appears at rest and unchanged  qualitatively shows us only its schema, so 
that it is not yet so much as a thing, that is, a thing in the usual sense as material-
real. 
It is also remarkable to note that the concept of schema (the concept of phantom) 
cannot be restricted merely to a single sense-sphere: 
 
A perceived thing also has its tactual schema, which comes to light in tactual grasping. In general, 
there are precisely as many strata there to be distinguished in the full schema as there are to be 
found classes of sensuous data which are spread over the spatial extension (appearing as 
something identical ) of the thing.10 
 
If up to now, we have taken the thing in isolation, it is time to consider that it is in 
relation to “circumstances” that the thing is what it is. 
Reality, called also “materiality”, as a matter of fact, does not lie only in the mere 
sensuous schema; there are in fact some functional connections which relate the 
schematic modifications of one aspect to those of other aspects. 
So long as the circumstances remain unchanged, the schema remains unchanged 
as well; at any rate, there is a rule according to which to similar circumstances 
belong similar functional dependencies: 
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A steel spring, once struck, executes certain oscillations and runs through certain successions of 
states of relative change of place and deformation: the spring has the real property of “elasticity”. 
As soon as a certain impetus is given, there occurs a corresponding deviation from the state of rest 
and a certain corresponding mode of oscillation.11 
 
The apperception of real properties include, as a matter of fact, not only the 
articulation in circumstances but also the functionally dependent changes of the 
schemata in such a way that this dependency holds in any given case. 
By virtue of a “realizing apprehension”, that is, of a kind of apprehension which 
constitutes the real thing as substrate of real properties, the schema or phantom 
acquires the character of a real determinateness: 
 
Over against the real unitary property, in our example the unchanged Objective color, there stands 
the momentary real state, which corresponds to the “circumstances” and which changes according 
to rules. The state coincides with the schema; yet it is not a mere schema (the thing is indeed not a 
mere phantom).12 
 
The thing-apprehension then considers the schema not exclusively as an extension 
filled merely sensuously but also as primal manifestation or “documentation” of 
real and causal properties; causal dependencies, according to Husserl, come to 
originary giveness, that is, they are not merely supposed, but also seen or 
perceived. 
Thus is possible to have various grasping of the thing, even if it is the identical 
substrate of states related to different circumstances: 
There are as many directions of unity prefigured in the causal apprehension of the 
schema (i.e., directions for possible series or perceptions in functional relation to 
series of perceptible circumstances) as there is multiplicity in the way in which 
the reality-thing, the unitary material “substance”, is determinable according to 
properties corresponding to the apprehended sense itself.13 
 
3. Systematic constitution of space 
Each body is constituted, according to Husserl, in an orientation and this means 
that each body is given to intuition in a kind of “quality”, in a location which has 
its dimensional modifications. 
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A body, as it is discussed above, is constituted as a sensuous schema by the sense 
of sight and  touch, but this is not the end of the story: every sense in fact is a 
sense only “through an apperceptive conjunction of the corresponding sense-data 
with kinaesthetic data”.14 
The kinaesthetic field is, in Husserls’ point of view, a field of continuous data; a 
kinaesthetic field is variable immediately and freely.  
The kinaesthetic field is introduced by Husserl for the purpose of penetrating as 
deeply as possible into the phenomenological constitution of the three 
dimensional spatiality: all spatiality, as a matter of fact, comes to givennes  in 
movement, that is, in the movement of the object itself and in the movement of 
the Ego. It is, as a matter of fact, a phenomenological law of constitution that the 
unity of the object demonstrates itself only in the unity of synthesis continually 
joining the manifold of perceptions: 
 
In our case, it means that an identical and unchanged spatial body demonstrates itself as such only 
in kinetic series of perceptions, which continually brings to appearance the various sides of that 
thing.15 
 
Visual contents are not sufficient in themselves to serve as apprehensional 
contents for visual spatiality and for a thing in general even if only visual and 
tactile contents have the peculiarity of coalescing into fields, capable as they are 
of bringing a thing to presentation; classes of sensation that have no fields are 
therefore incapable of a projective presentation: 
 
I am naturally thinking here of the sensations of movement. They play an essential role in the 
apprehension of every external thing, but they are not themselves apprehended in such a way that 
they make representable either a proper or an improper matter; they do not belong to the 
“projection” of the thing. Nothing qualitative corresponds to them in the thing, nor they adumbrate 
bodies or present them by way of projection. And yet without their cooperation there is no body 
there, no thing.16 
 
However, according to Husserl, the incapability of the sensations of movement to 
present any matter does not apply to the Ego-Body into which these sensations are 
inserted as appearances. If, as a matter of fact, the Body is also a thing, a physical 
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thing like any other, on the other hand it is the bearer of the Ego: which has 
sensations that are localized in the Body. 
The touching hand “appears” as having touch sensations. If we turn to the touched Object, 
smoothness and roughness appear as belonging to it. But if I attend to the touching hand, then it 
possesses the sensation of smoothness and the sensation of roughness, and it possesses them on or 
in the appearing finger tips. Likewise, the sensations of location and of movement, which have 
their Objectivating function, are attributed immediately to the hand and to the arm, as encased in 
them.17 
 
4. The correlation between the visual field and the kinaesthetic sequences 
Every field is, according to Husserl, a fixed system of locations and this means 
that every element of sensation has its corresponding location, its “here”; more 
particularly, the visual field is a two-dimensional manifold which is in itself 
congruent, continuous, utterly coherent, finite and bounded. 
All the terms that are appropriate to the visual field, such as line, point, location, 
shape cannot be, in Husserl’s point of view, understood in the spatial sense: 
 
We already said earlier that the visual field is not some sort of surface in Objective space, which 
makes no sense, any more than points and lines in the visual field are points and lines in Objective 
space or even have any spatial relation whatsoever to spatial points and lines.18 
 
A concretum in the field can change “quasi-materially” (“quasi” means here that 
the parameters involved are not empirically objective, but phenomenological law-
like) according to variables like quality, brilliance, saturation and so on; it can 
also change in size, shape or location by virtue of kinaesthetic sequences.  
Kinaesthetic sensations lack an essential relation to the visual sensations, “they 
are connected to them functionally but not essentially”;19 kinaesthetic sensations 
form continuous multidimensional systems in which continuous unities appear 
only as sequences, that is, by filling a span of time. 
For instance, we assume that a kinaesthetic ocular sensation K1 is at first constant, 
the thing remaining stationary too,  during the stream of time t0-t1; in this 
streaming time then the visual image i1 remains also constant. If then K1 changes, 
in a continuous sequence, into K2, then the image i1, during the new span of time, 
changes also into i2. 
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If K2 reverts back to K1, then also i2 changes into i1 in the same time span: 
 
In every appearance of a stationary thing, these two factors or sensation are involved, the K-factor 
and the i-factor. Their relation is one of dependence, as we have just attempted to determine. And 
the dependence is reciprocal. The same K-sensation is accompanied by the same image, and the 
same image also by the same K-sensation.20     
 
To a complex of K’s and i’s is attached an apprehensional character which refers 
to the possible sequences of i in the total system under the possible kinaesthetic 
circumstances; ideal possibilities of fulfillment then arise in the elapsing of such 
system: 
 
In every such nexus of fulfillment, the images are subtended by the consciousness of unity, which 
is and remains the same, where the appurtenant appearances are fulfilled, under the relevant 
kinaesthetic circumstances, in the sense of the general type.21   
 
The consciousness of unity constitutes the one identical thing as is presented 
identically through the images and under the relevant circumstances; the 
continuity of images is a linear manifold “extracted out” of a multidimensional 
manifold of possible images which are linked to K’s through the unity of the 
continuity of apprehension: the latter unites the K’s and the i’s belonging to every 
temporal phase into an apprehensional unity. 
According to Husserl, there are two important and essential components 
belonging to the temporal elapsing of each apprehensional phase: the i-component 
and the K-component. 
 
The former supplies the “intention toward,” the latter the motivation of this intention. The 
“intention toward” is differentiated and directed  in such and such a way under these circumstances 
K. More precisely, the stream of the K’s or, to be exact, the stream of these K’s, determines by 
way of motivation the type and form of the “intention toward” in its elapsing. Every phase of the i-
component is an “intention toward” in such a way that it penetrates the next phase, i.e., penetrates 
its image, by referring to it and referring trough it: here the i-component fulfills itself, but it again 
penetrates the next phase and again is fulfilled, etc., such that every I is both fulfillment and 
fulfilling and is so natural by means  of  its apprehensional function.22  
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The system of K’s becomes more complex when we expand the system of 
movements: besides the elapsing of kinaesthetic sensations of the eye, designated 
above as K, there might elapse kinaesthetic sensations pertaining to the head, the 
trunk and so on. In this respect, we are provided, as it were, with a complex of 
variables (K, K’, K’’,…)that, as Husserl notes, are independently variable in 
relation to one another but in such a way that they form a system where each of 
the variables has a definite value: 
 
Nevertheless, since the change in the images, i.e., the character of the delimitation and fulfillment 
of the visual field, is not merely dependent on the individual K-variables, but also on the manifold 
system (K, K’, K’’, …), and since the variation of the K’s ( a name for the “K’, K’’, K’’, …), in 
the case of the constancy of K, determines new occurrences and manifolds of images of a new 
type, the intentional system from the very outset is therefore a complicated one.23 
 
5.The constitution of space: the stationary thing 
Let us start from an absolutely stationary world of things, a world, as it were, 
which lacks qualitative or phoronomic changes of its Objects; qualitative 
discontinuity is what gives the oculomotor image separate existence: the figure or 
object is distinguished by the fact that its coloration does not blend into that of the 
surroundings. Change in orientation and in expansion, in the continuity of the 
oculomotor fields, creates unities of appurtenance and contains principles of 
conjunction; notwithstanding such changes, an identity penetrates every constant 
modification so that “every part which has arisen as continuous out of one part of 
the original image presents the same image”.24 
The same holds for the concealment: if an image constantly obliterates another 
image then, according to a rule, the image that is not yet obliterated remains a 
presentation of the same thing; when nevertheless the movement is reversed the 
Object is continuously built back up: 
 
This constant demolition and rebuilding due to such a concealing Object is a system of 
modifications which is strictly motivated by the kinaesthetic circumstances.25 
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When an Object is constantly concealed, its full intentions, as a matter of fact, 
become empty , even if they do not lack the character of perceptual intentions, 
motivated in the motivational nexus. 
Let us now proceed to the class of modifications included under the term 
“expansion”; it can apply unitarily to the whole field or to different pieces of the 
same. 
It holds, according to a phenomenological law, that what pertains to the unity of a 
continuous expansion also pertains to the unity of a presentation; admittedly, it is 
possible that different types of expansion can indeed be joined into the unity of an 
object: 
 
Think, for instance, of the case of two mutually bounded surfaces. Let us take simultaneously 
visible and mutually bounded surfaces of a polyhedron which present themselves in different 
expansional modifications. Yet the two series of modifications belong together; they pertain to the 
same kinaesthetic circumstances, they stream on together, and they form in this unitary stream a 
determinate type of unitary modification.26 
 
Expansion moreover can be mixed with concealment as in the case of an 
undulating surface which undergoes kinaesthetic change. 
Under the heading of the modification of turning, we require that concealment 
and unconcealment are in play in a way different from that in which the 
acquisition and loss of presentational content have their source in the entering and 
exiting of parts of images into or out of the oculomotor field. 
Husserl distinguishes between “pure receding” which is a linear modification, that 
is, a kinaesthetic system in which the motivating circumstances vary infinitely in a 
linearly orthoid manner form, and “pure turning” that is a cyclical modification 
where the kinaesthetic circumstances vary cyclically, bringing back the turning 
series of images. 
When an object undergoes a modification of remoteness, the image contracts in 
infinitum, having the “null-point” as the limit; in the reverse direction, we 
encounter the infinite enlargement of the image: in these cases the appearing side 
is ever the same; the other sides, as it were, appear through the possible 
modifications of turning. 
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Husserl remarks that mere expansion is a modification that is not related to mere 
change in orientation, because the latter is the displacement or rotation of a figure 
that maintains its identity in the oculomotor field: 
 
 
As regards expansion, on the other hand, the points do not retain their reciprocal orientation. The 
concept of expansion implies in the first place, generally speaking, a change in the location of the 
points in the field. Where all the points maintain their location, we can naturally not speak of a 
modification.27 
 
Turning, as distinct from expansion, constantly brings new presentational contents 
so that to say “the object is turning” means the same as saying that it constantly 
shoes itself from new sides; when a complete revolution is carried out, the 
sequential appearance of sides brings to appearance the closedness of the nexus of 
sides and therefore, gets the complete corporeal surface to appear as a closed one. 
Expansional modification lacks, as mere receding and approaching, the cyclical 
character; it has the character of “bilaterality”  where “bilateral” means that it has 
two and only two directions which fuse as opposites into a linear manifold. 
 
6.Qualitative and phoronomic change of the thing 
In the preceding remarks we have started from the assumption that the world of 
things is absolutely stationary, stationary not only in the phoronomic sense, but 
also in the qualitative one. We can consider now the changeableness of qualities, 
e.g. coloration, of the things; everything has its pre-empirical form (size for 
example) and its pre-empirical qualities (color, for example) as filling the form in 
all its parts: both these components can undergo their changes, thus constituting 
the objective form filled throughout with objective qualities. 
Coloration, Husserl adds, is, on one side, variable independently of the form, but, 
on the other side, it is inseparable from the form because it reveals itself as the 
condition of possibility of the concrete form, that is, a condition of possibility for 
the constitution of corporeality.  
As to the question of how is the thing constituted as identical in qualitative 
change, we can state that the thing is what is unitary when the qualities change 
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and the form remains identical: the thing is a multidimensional infinite manifold of 
image-modifications which becomes the bearer of the consciousness of unity; 
when, i.e., the coloration changes unexpectedly, then the actual perception 
experiences a leap by virtue of which it no longer elapses in  the sense of the 
original apprehension. In this way, the apprehension disappoints the intention 
instead of fulfilling it so that the consciousness has the form of the “otherwise”. 
When the coloration changes continuously, kinaesthesias can be absolutely 
stationary for a certain period of time: in this case, the image endures unchanged 
with regard to pre-empirical form and location, even if the coloration changes. 
Passing over to the complete system of kinaesthetic motivations, the image is 
absorbed into the infinities of possible modifications pertaining to the kinaesthetic 
systems of the Body: 
 
In the system of absolute non-change, there pertains to every kinaesthetic situation, to every 
determinate Bodily position (once the coordination is carried out through a first perception), a 
strictly determinate appearance according to color as well as form, and to every kinaesthetic series, 
to every determinate change in position, there pertains a determinate series of appearances.28 
 
A second basic type of change is movement, first of all, movement without 
qualitative change, thus mere movement. 
What characterizes movement is the fact that the object occupies different 
locations, thus undergoing a change, even if it remains the same: sameness here 
means that two co-existing things are completely the same, except for their 
location, if each of them is constituted in the same manifold of appearances. Their 
difference can reside only in the kinaesthetic relations, in their relations to other 
things; in this case, the continuous change does not affect the kinaesthetic 
coordination: 
 
For instance, if I keep my body stationary, perhaps while sitting, and even keep my eyes still, then, 
at the beginning of the course of movement of the thing, the image α pertains to this bodily 
posture, thus to the determinate K-complex. Now the thing moves. If we extract a phase of the 
movement, it offers a different image, β as pertaining to the same K (I am still sitting) but to a 
different time. Thereby, however, this β-image also already pertains to the thing in its initial 
location, prior to the movement. But in order to reach this image, I must assume a different bodily 
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posture: K’. Due to the movement of the thing, however, β is now connected to K instead of K’. 
Likewise, α also pertains to the thing in its new location, but α is not coordinated to K but to a 
different K, let us say K’’.29  
 
 
7. The importance of the Body for Husserl 
According to Husserl, the importance of  the Body, intended as lived body, is not 
only due to the fact that it is the basis of the constitution of the three-dimensional 
space, but also to the more massive fact that everything that appears belongs to its  
(the lived body’s) environs; thanks to the Body I am at the center of things and, 
for this reason, the “I-myself” is a bodily self, as it were, the “I-center” of all my 
experiences. 
My Body then can be conceived as a “null-body” (Nullkoerper) thanks to which 
everything in my immediate surrounding is given a location. 
My Body, as the zero point in analytical geometry, has the property of seeming 
always to be unmoving in relation to the surrounding world; it moreover presents 
fundamental anomalies which distinguish it from all other things: 
 
In popular terms, every thing in the whole world can escape from me, except for my own Body… 
the manifold of images that pertains to the Body has a distinctive kinaesthetic motivation in 
contrast to other things.30 
 
For instance, when we walk we do not experience only a movement of the legs in 
relation to the other parts of the Body, but also a movement of the entire visible 
Body through a change in its distance from other bodies; the Ego-point does not 
recede, it is always co-moved: 
 
 The Body moves, but does so without “receding” from itself: the images of it do not change in the 
sense of  “receding”. In this way, therefore, the Ego moves.31 
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The Body thus is stationary to itself so that the true stabilitas loci is not to be 
found in God or in the enduring landmarks, but in myself. 
According to Edward Casey, Kant was right to think that the Body is the source of 
orientation, but he did not show that it is such a source only inasmuch it is the 
stable center of the perceptual field.32 
Husserl posits between the lived body and the objective space a Sehraum, a purely 
visual space, in order to make the objective space a lived space: the visual space 
has its own system of places (Ortssystem) even if the notion of “place” here is 
conceived mainly as simple location; this last assumption would be demonstrated 
by the fact that Husserl uses Ort (place) and Lage (position) interchangeable.33 
Anyway, it seems that Husserl introduces a new conception of place: as a matter 
of fact, the kinesthetic motivations make of the invariably given manifold of 
places something which is never given without a K (e.g. a kinaesthetic sensation). 
The feeling of my own body being or moving in a place affects the way I 
experience that place. 
Casey writes: 
 
And if kinesthetic self-awareness is itself the basic form that awareness of my body takes (whether 
this corporeal consciousness be visual or tactile), then  it will constitute a privileged entry into 
place as I actually experience it. Feeling my body means feeling how it is to occupy the place it is 
in.34 
 
Kinesthetic self-awareness has the character of spontaneity (Spontaneitaet) and 
this means that its domain is a system of kinaesthetic situations; this character has 
the form of a “von-mir-aus-Geschehen”35, as it were, of an occurring thanks to 
me. Such a system, determined as spontaneity of the kinaesthetic consciousness, 
actualizes practical possibilities (Vermoeglichkeiten) and, for this reason, it has 
the character of movement (Bewegung). 
It is also plausible, on the ground of phenomenological analyses, to suppose that 
receptivity (Rezeptivitaet), that is, the givenness of appearances in an objective 
apprehension, would depend on kinaesthetic situations so that even the passive 
layer of consciousness would be founded on the active layer of the same36; the 
link and interaction between receptivity and spontaneity can be achieved by the 
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consciousness of the Body which functions as a structural regulative system 
(Regelstruktur). 
Claesges states as: 
 
Durch den Leib (als Moment des kinaesthetischen Bewusstseins) wird die Rezeptivitaet so 
geregelt, dass sie nur als Empfindung moeglich ist, d.h. zugleich immer auch als ein Vorkommnis 
an einer in Raum und Zeit erscheineden Gegenstaendlichkeit aufgefasst warden kann.37 
 
The foundational correlation between receptivity and spontaneity would depend 
ultimately on the uniqueness of the Body : it, as a matter of fact, comes ahead of 
every constitution of spatial-temporal objects, even ahead of that constitution 
thanks to which it appears as res extensa. The Body is not primarily an object, it is 
much more a structural totality (Strukturganzheit) that belongs to the a priori of 
the perceptual and kinaesthetic consciousness. 
The Body, in contrast with other objects, is constituted by the “reflection” 
(Reflexivitaet) of the tactile system; insofar as it is subject to the availableness 
(Verfuegbarkeit) of the Ego, the Body reveals itself as an Ego opposed to the 
outer world: 
 
Dadurch ergibt sich ein doppeltes Verhaeltnis des Ich zu seinem Leibe. Einmal muss sich das Ich 
mit seinem Leibe identifizieren koennen, den sonst waere nicht einsichtig, wieso das Ich selber in 
der Welt sein koennte; zum anderen muss sich das Ich von seinem Leib unterscheiden koennen, 
denn der Leib ist eine kinaestetisch konstituierte Gegenstaendlichkeit, die als solche ein Ich der 
kinaesthetischen Vermoeglichkeiten voraussetzt.38  
 
Husserl seems to lack an articulated concept of lived space, even if he resorts to 
various substitutes of the same: think not only of the notion of “concrete 
appearance” (Apparenz), but also, and above all, of that of the “the near-sphere” 
(Nahsphaere): 
 
Thanks to my kinesthesias, I have access to a near-sphere that is a major part of my “core-world” 
(Kernwelt). In and through- and around- this circle of nearness, places are constellated as nearby 
areas in/to which I can move. The near-sphere includes the approachability implied in the “I can”  
of kinaesthetic awareness. My own near-sphere is in effect the proximal place or places in which I 
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am or to which I can go (my far-sphere, in contrast, contains places to which I do not have 
immediate access.39 
 
The near-sphere not only fills the gap between body and place, but it is relevant 
also for the constitution of space since this does not arise from pure intuition but 
from concrete things to which we have access; “nearness” can be defined as what 
I can see in a small stretch of time, in a unitary comprehensive intuition and in a 
kinesthetic aspect relative to a unified consciousness.40  
The Husserlian notion of “nearness”, even if more theoretical, can be drawn near 
to the Heideggerian “closeness” which, however, presents an existential turn; 
Heidegger thinks of the human implacement in terms of “The Aroundness of the 
Environment and Dasein’s spatiality”: “closeness” represents, in his point of view, 
the most salient characteristic of the spatiality of the ready-to-hand in its 
familiarity: 
 
Every entity that is ‘to hand’ has a different closeness, which is not to be ascertained by measuring 
distances. This closeness regulates itself in terms of circumspectively ‘calculative’ manipulating 
and using… When this closeness of the equipment has been given directionality, this signifies no 
merely that the equipment has its position (Stelle) in space as present-at-hand somewhere, but also 
that as equipment it has been essentially fitted up and installed, set up, and put to rights.41 
 
The richness here of the notion of “closeness”, associated as it is with terms such 
as “familiarity”, “calculative manipulating” or “equipment”, marks its distance 
from the Husserlian concept of “nearness” which gets rid of the existential 
concreteness of the Heideggerian “closeness”. 
The notion of “closeness” or that of “nearness” assume an even more important 
role in Heidegger’s very late writings: this relevance is indicated by the verbal 
proliferation of terms like the active gerund “naehernd” or noun forms like 
“nearhood” (Nahheit) and “nighness” (Nahnis). Thanks to nearness, the Open is 
nor enclosed from without neither gathered as a region or located as a thing: it 
points much more to a neighborhood, that is, to the nearness of things and people 
who coinhabit a place in common.42 
46 
Giorgio Rizzo 
 
It remains now to answer the question of what, in Husserl’s point of view, makes 
possible the passage from the near-sphere to the objective space. 
Spatiality, that is, objective space, is constituted through the concatenation of 
places available to me in my near-sphere; according to Casey, what we call 
“space” is not just the correlate, as it is for Claesges, of my kinesthetically felt 
near-sphere but its very expansion. In Husserl’s point of view, the apperceptive 
expansion (Erweiterung) of the near-sphere is achieved in a homogeneous infinite 
open world of space: 
 
This amounts to saying that the emptying and amalgamation of particular spaces, each of which is 
felt kinesthetically by the lived body, becomes in short order the planiform, absolute space of 
Newton. But that is possible only to the extent that places themselves depend on the lived body as 
the I-center or null-point, the “absolute here”, of any given perceptual field.43 
 
The lived body, according to Husserl, is not itself in space as a physical object 
exists in space; it moves through space as “indirectly co-localized” in its 
movements: 
 
My body- in particular, say, the bodily part “hand”-moves in space; [but] the activity of holding 
sway, “kinesthesis”, which is embodied together with the body’s movement, is not itself in space 
as a spatial movement but is only indirectly co-localized in that movement.44 
 
Only by virtue of this original experience of the bodily holding-sway, I am able to 
understand another physical body as a living body in which another “I” is 
embodied and holds sway. 
If we believe that only natural sciences would capture the true nature of things, 
then, as a matter of fact, we are compelled to think that the Lebenswelt is merely 
subjective and relative, treating the world as if it could exist independently of any 
human accomplishment; Husserl opposes this view; it is because it does not 
justice  to the very subjectivity which accomplishes science. 
